Czech context
Risk to the public, Bulovka, travellers, health workers and Czech official and supporting sources in one place.
Current overview of the outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in DR Congo and Uganda, as checked on 7 September 2026.
English edition — current snapshot. This page mirrors the Czech edition as of 7 September 2026. Case numbers change quickly; figures are stated with their source, publication date and data as-of date.
The risk to the public in the Czech Republic remains very low. The current outbreak is serious mainly for the affected communities in Ituri, for close contacts of patients, and for health workers in the outbreak zone.
Risk to the public, Bulovka, travellers, health workers and Czech official and supporting sources in one place.
Ebolaviruses in general, the difference between Ebola virus and Bundibugyo virus, transmission, diagnostics and sequencing.
What is approved for Ebola virus, what is still missing for Bundibugyo, and what is being trialled.
West Africa 2014–2016 and North Kivu/Ituri 2018–2020 as the main lessons for 2026.
Recurring narratives, the Czech context, and quick answers on Bulovka, Těchonín and Berlin.
Official, Czech, expert, media and other sources grouped by type.
Figures are presented by source with their respective data cut-off dates and evidence limits. DRC INSP/COUSP SitRep 113 reports 6,522 confirmed cases, 3,134 confirmed deaths, 1,516 recoveries and 817 patients in isolation or treatment centres as of 4 September. WHO's daily update through 4 September uses the same DRC cut-off; while retaining older dates for Uganda and France, it reports an international total of 6,543 confirmed cases, 3,136 confirmed deaths and 1,535 recoveries. Country cut-off dates differ, so this is not a same-day total.
SitRep 113 lists 61 affected health zones out of 151 across six provinces and newly reports Kayna in North Kivu. Compared with the previous published version based on SitRep 110, the national cumulative total rose by 272 cases, 95 deaths and 77 recoveries; the number of affected provinces remains six.
SitReps 111–113 directly report daily case/death pairs of 92/33, 94/23 and 86/39 for 2–4 September. For 4 September, the reported deaths comprise 30 community deaths and 9 confirmed deaths in treatment centres. We use the explicitly reported components rather than merely subtracting cumulative values. Daily figures are not interpreted as dates of infection or death.
More than 200 passengers on a river boat near Maluku outside Kinshasa were temporarily quarantined and examined after a former passenger died. On 9 August, AP reported, citing the DRC Ministry of Health and INRB, that all suspected cases tested negative for Bundibugyo virus. No case was therefore confirmed in Kinshasa; the media report is not used for national totals.
On 10 August, WHO Regional Director for Africa Mohamed Yakub Janabi said, according to AP, that sequencing indicated the outbreak began in February and that some early cases had been attributed to other diseases. A newer phylodynamic analysis posted on 25 August and updated on 27 August uses 525 genomes in its main analysis after quality control and centres the estimated most recent common ancestor in late February; the 95% interval extends approximately from mid-January to late March. This is a preliminary model-based estimate from sampled genomes, not a directly observed exact date of zoonotic introduction.
WHO AFRO report 16, with data as of 30 August, describes sustained transmission, high mortality and continuing geographic expansion; 516 cases and 270 deaths were added since report 15. Transmission persists in Ituri and is intensifying in North Kivu and Haut-Uélé. When rechecked on 7 September, WHO's link labelled as the report 16 download still returned the older report 12, so these claims use only the explicit official summary on the WHO AFRO page. On 1 September, WHO's Director-General called this the second-largest and fastest-moving recorded Ebola outbreak and highlighted community deaths, unsafe burials and unknown transmission chains. At the 7 September check, Pathoplexus/LAPIS contained 753 versioned Bdbv-2026 database entries: 731 from the DRC, 20 from Uganda and 2 from Germany, unchanged from the previous published version. Database entries are not clinical cases; their count is not the number of genomes in one analysis or evidence of changed viral properties.
On 4 September, the DRC government, WHO, the UN, Africa CDC and other partners launched a revised 180-day multisectoral response plan. It aims to strengthen surveillance, contact tracing, patient care, community engagement, risk communication, logistics and preparedness in at-risk provinces. Needs for full implementation are estimated at US$1.3 billion; that amount is a needs estimate, not confirmation that all funding has been secured.
In the Czech Republic, a woman with fever after returning from Uganda was transferred under controlled conditions to Bulovka University Hospital on 1 August. She was placed in precautionary isolation and samples were sent to the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin. On 2 August, Czech health authorities announced that tests including Ebola were negative. She remained in care for further diagnosis; this was not a confirmed Ebola case and did not change the very low risk to the public.
On 27 August, WHO AFRO formally announced the end of Uganda's outbreak after completion of 42 days without a new confirmed case. Uganda recorded 20 confirmed cases, of whom 18 recovered and 2 died. The announcement confirms the earlier national declaration and cessation of local transmission; it does not mean that reintroduction from the DRC is impossible, and it does not change continuing transmission or the PHEIC status in the DRC.
The second IHR Emergency Committee meeting was held on 18 August, and WHO published the full meeting report on 28 August. The Committee recommended maintaining the public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) and stressed the need for urgent, intensified and sustained action. Other states are advised to strengthen readiness and inform travellers; WHO does not recommend flight suspensions or denial of entry to travellers. This is not a newly declared pandemic emergency.
Vaccination of health and other frontline workers with Ervebo began on 27 August, including in Kisangani; WHO DON 616 directly confirms the operational start. Updated WHO guidance published on 1 September finds the evidence on Ervebo against BDBV insufficient for programmatic use. As its main principle, it recommends use within a research protocol and identifies a well-designed randomised ring-vaccination trial as the most reliable way to answer the question. If an appropriate trial or vaccine-effectiveness study is infeasible, WHO allows exceptional off-label use outside a research protocol provided that robust, systematic vaccination records identify recipients and can be linked to subsequent exposures and health outcomes. Human protection against BDBV remains unknown, vaccination is not regulatory approval for BDBV and does not replace other measures. According to WHO's 1 September briefing, three vaccines and three therapeutics are in clinical trials. ECDC's page updated on 4 September continues to assess the likelihood of infection for people living in the EU/EEA as very low; numerically it uses SitRep 111 data as of 2 September.
| Source | Publication and data as-of date | Key figure | How to read it |
|---|---|---|---|
| DRC INSP / COUSP SitRep 113 | Data as of 4 September; PDF dated 5 September; published 5 September; checked 7 September | 6,522 confirmed cases, 3,134 confirmed deaths, 1,516 recoveries, 817 patients in isolation or treatment centres, 86.0% of contacts under follow-up and a current case-fatality ratio of 48.1%. | The latest primary national status located. It directly reports 86 cases and 39 deaths (30 community + 9 in treatment centres) for 4 September; these are not automatically dates of infection or death. |
| WHO AFRO Weekly External Situation Report 16 | Data as of 30 August; checked 7 September | 6,100 confirmed cases and 2,950 confirmed deaths, 516 cases and 270 deaths more than in report 15. | WHO describes sustained transmission, high mortality and continuing geographic expansion. The download link still returns the older report 12, so we use only the explicit official summary on the WHO AFRO page. |
| WHO AFRO: 100 days since outbreak declaration | Published 24 August; checked 7 September | WHO calls the event the fastest-growing Ebola outbreak in DRC history, reports about 90 confirmed cases per day during the first three months and warns that transmission is outpacing control efforts. | This is a trend and operational assessment; SitRep 113 is numerically newer. |
| DRC INSP / WHO AFRO: geographic distribution | Data as of 4 September | The outbreak affects six provinces and 61 of 151 health zones. | SitRep 113 newly reports Kayna in North Kivu; this is not a new province or country. |
| WHO daily epidemiological update | Data through 4 September; DRC as of 4 September, Uganda as of 21 July and France as of 6 July | 6,543 confirmed cases, 3,136 confirmed deaths and 1,535 recoveries across three countries. | The Total row agrees with the country-row sum. Countries have different cut-off dates, so this is not a same-day status for all three. |
| DRC and partners: revised response plan | Launched 4 September; WHO AFRO published 4 September | The revised multisectoral plan covers 180 days and estimates needs for full implementation at US$1.3 billion. | This is a planned strengthening of the response and a needs estimate; the announcement does not confirm that the entire amount is funded. |
| DRC: Ervebo vaccination begins | Event on 27 August; WHO DON 616 published 28 August | Health and other frontline workers began receiving Ervebo from the previously announced allocation. | WHO directly confirms the operational start. Ervebo remains licensed for EBOV, and protection against BDBV is unproven. |
| WHO: second IHR Emergency Committee meeting | Meeting on 18 August; full report published 28 August | The Committee recommended maintaining the PHEIC and called for urgent, intensified and sustained action. | WHO does not recommend flight suspensions or denial of entry to travellers. The event remains a PHEIC; this is not a new pandemic declaration. |
| WHO Rapid Risk Assessment v4 | Assessment dated 14 August; published 20 August; checked 7 September | Very high risk in the DRC, high risk in countries sharing land borders with the DRC, and low risk for the rest of Africa and globally. | This is the current risk framework, not the latest numerical status. WHO reports moderate confidence for the DRC, neighbouring countries and the rest of Africa and high confidence globally. |
| Czech suspected case after return from Uganda | Event on 1–2 August; checked 11 August | A woman with fever was transferred under controlled conditions to precautionary isolation at Bulovka. Berlin tests including Ebola were negative. | This was not a confirmed case or community transmission. The response demonstrates preparedness and does not change the very low risk to the public. |
| WHO AFRO / Uganda Ministry of Health | WHO announcement on 27 August after completion of the 42-day period | WHO formally announced the end of Uganda's outbreak: 20 confirmed cases, 18 recoveries and 2 confirmed deaths. | The end of the outbreak confirms that no new confirmed case was detected for two maximum incubation periods. Reintroduction from the continuing DRC outbreak remains possible. |
| WHO AFRO: cross-border consultation in Bangui | Event and publication on 14 August; checked 20 August | CAR, the DRC, the Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Uganda began preparing a joint roadmap; a mobile laboratory was deployed in Obo. | This is strengthened regional preparedness and border surveillance, not a new confirmed case in the Central African Republic. |
| DRC MoH / INRB via AP: river boat near Maluku | Results announced 8 August; AP published 9 August; checked 11 August | More than 200 temporarily quarantined passengers were screened; all suspected cases that were tested were negative for Bundibugyo virus. | No case was confirmed in Kinshasa. AP is used to relay the official results, not as a source for national totals. |
| WHO AFRO Director via AP / INRB / CDC MMWR | Briefing statement on 10 August; INRB genomic analysis posted 9 July; CDC model posted 5 June; checked 11 August | AP quotes the statement that sequencing indicated a February start. INRB estimates a common ancestor around March with an interval from February to April; CDC estimates a possible spillover in mid to late February. | Official evidence supports the possibility of undetected transmission in February, not a directly observed exact date. No separate public WHO record of the briefing was located. |
| WHO: updated Ervebo guidance for BDBV | Document dated 31 August; published 1 September | Evidence is insufficient for programmatic use. The main recommendation is use within a research protocol; a narrow exception applies only when an appropriate study is infeasible and robust traceable records exist. | Human efficacy remains unknown. This is not approval for BDBV and vaccination does not replace core measures. |
| WHO: Member States briefing | Published 1 September | WHO calls this the second-largest and fastest-moving recorded Ebola outbreak; three vaccines and three therapeutics are in clinical trials. | This is an operational summary and research status, not approval of a vaccine or treatment for BDBV. |
| WHO AFRO: Kasenyi/Tchomia mobile laboratory | Report published 4 August; laboratory deployed 23 July. | Diagnostic time fell from as much as five hours to about one; more than 20 samples were processed in the first days, and laboratories able to confirm Ebola increased from 2 to 18. | Operational strengthening of laboratory capacity near the DRC–Uganda border, not a new epidemiological total. |
| WHO AFRO: operational response status | Statement published 17 July; its numerical example is explicitly dated 16 July. | WHO says that more than 80% of new cases were detected outside known contact lists, around two thirds of deaths occurred in communities, and facilities in the hardest-hit areas were at or near capacity. | We use this as operational context; the statement’s older case counts do not replace report 16 or WHO's 1 September briefing. |
| WHO Disease Outbreak News DON613 | Published 17 July; DRC as of 15 July, Uganda as of 14/17 July | It confirms 2,124 cases and 828 deaths in the DRC, 46 affected zones, including 38 with cases in the previous 21 days, continuing transmission and Uganda's countdown. The patient treated in Frankfurt is stable. | WHO again notes that newly reported cases and deaths may reflect retrospective sample processing and data harmonisation. The DON reports at least 410 recoveries including the patient treated in Germany; WHO table 20260717 reports 409 for the DRC, Uganda and France. |
| WHO briefing, PARTNERS trial and diagnostic EUL | Published 2 July; epidemiological, clinical and laboratory context as of the same day | WHO reports 1,406 confirmed cases and 438 deaths in the DRC, an average of 38 new confirmed cases per day over the preceding two weeks, expanded laboratory capacity to 10 laboratories, and patient enrolment in the PARTNERS trial evaluating MBP134 and remdesivir alone and in combination. WHO also announced the first emergency-use listing of a molecular diagnostic test for BDBV. | This is clinical evaluation of candidate therapeutics and emergency listing of a diagnostic test, not approval of a specific treatment or vaccine. The Science article is useful only as secondary explanatory reporting on this trial; the primary support remains WHO. |
| INRB / ANRS MIE–Inserm / ALIMA: EBO-PEP | Trial launched 14 July; recruitment begins in Ituri | EBO-PEP evaluates obeldesivir as post-exposure prophylaxis in asymptomatic direct contacts of a confirmed case during the preceding five days. Nearly 1,000 participants are planned in the DRC and Uganda. | This is an investigational clinical trial, not approved or proven effective prophylaxis. A separate planned remdesivir subprotocol for selected groups is not routine care. |
| WHO target product profile for vaccines against BDBV | Published 14 July | The document sets minimum and preferred characteristics for future vaccine candidates, including target populations, efficacy, safety, dosing, storage and manufacturing. | This is a research and development profile, not approval of a specific vaccine or evidence of efficacy. |
| Oxford / CEPI / HRA: ChAdOx1 BDBV | First volunteer vaccinated 24 July; the Phase I trial is planned to enrol 50 healthy adults. | The candidate vaccine was administered to a human for the first time. The trial primarily evaluates safety and immune response. | This is an investigational vaccine candidate in early clinical evaluation, not a proven effective or licensed vaccine and not a public vaccination programme. |
| Moderna / ClinicalTrials.gov: mRNA-1469 | First participants vaccinated 4 August; recruiting registry status posted 11 August. | The Phase I trial estimates enrolment of 84 healthy adults; the Truro site is recruiting and two other Canadian sites are not yet recruiting. | This is not an approved or proven effective vaccine. Phase I recruitment is not public vaccination. |
| Lancet Infectious Diseases modelling study | Published online 25 June; model calibrated to 598 confirmed cases as of 8 June, with interim notes to 22 June | The study estimated possible outbreak size and cross-border spillover risk for preparedness. It works with data older than WHO 20260717 and cannot be used as the current numerical overview. | Useful as expert context on uncertainty, delayed detection and preparedness, not as a replacement for current WHO/INSP/ECDC counts. |
| US CDC | Statement of 10 July | CDC reported confirmed Bundibugyo virus infection in a US citizen working for a humanitarian organisation in the DRC. The patient was subsequently medically evacuated under controlled conditions to Frankfurt. | The infection was acquired in the DRC; this is not transmission in the USA or Germany. |
| Czech official and relevant sources | Checked 7 September; Czech sources are not the primary source of current counts in the DRC and Uganda. | The suspected case in a woman returning from Uganda was ruled out by laboratory testing on 2 August. Czech MFA travel advice remained substantively unchanged and was labelled valid on 7 September. | No confirmed case or community transmission has been publicly reported in the Czech Republic; ECDC continues to assess the risk to the general EU/EEA population as very low. |
In Rapid Risk Assessment v4, dated 14 August and published on 20 August, WHO assesses the risk as very high in the DRC, high in countries sharing land borders with the DRC, and low for the rest of Africa and globally. The updated temporary recommendations advise other states to provide current information to travellers, including advice against travel to areas with community transmission. WHO does not recommend flight suspensions or denial of entry to travellers. On the page updated on 4 September, ECDC continues to assess the likelihood of infection for people living in the EU/EEA as very low.
Detailed dated sources are on the Sources page. A standalone chart of the DRC daily series is on the Case and death trajectory chart page.
This short overview keeps only the events that change the interpretation of the outbreak. Daily numerical interim statuses and detailed changes are listed in the sources.
| Date of event | What happened | Why it matters | Main source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Sep 2026 | WHO publishes updated Ervebo guidance and the Director-General's briefing to Member States. | The main recommendation is use against BDBV within a research protocol; the narrow exception requires that an appropriate study be infeasible and robust traceable records be maintained. Human protection remains unknown. | WHO |
| 30 Aug 2026 | WHO AFRO publishes report 16 with data as of 30 August. | It confirms 6,100 cases, 2,950 deaths and expansion to 60 health zones; transmission is intensifying in North Kivu and Haut-Uélé. | WHO AFRO Weekly External Situation Report 16 |
| 27 Aug 2026 | WHO AFRO formally announces the end of Uganda's outbreak after completion of 42 days without a new confirmed case. | Uganda recorded 20 confirmed cases, 18 recoveries and 2 confirmed deaths. Reintroduction from the continuing DRC outbreak remains possible. | WHO AFRO / Uganda MoH |
| 27–28 Aug 2026 | Vaccination of health and other frontline workers with Ervebo begins in the DRC; WHO confirms the start. | This is a new operational step in the response. Ervebo is licensed for EBOV; protection against BDBV is unproven, and starting vaccination is not regulatory approval for BDBV. | WHO DON 616 / DRC MoH |
| 17–20 Aug 2026 | On 17 August, ICG informed the DRC of the immediate initial allocation of 70,000 Ervebo doses; WHO and Africa CDC published the announcement on 20 August. | 20,000 doses are allocated to a Phase III trial and 50,000 to health and frontline workers; possible protection against BDBV remains unproven. | WHO / Africa CDC / ICG |
| 4 Sep 2026 | The DRC and partners launch a revised 180-day multisectoral response plan. | The plan aims to strengthen core response functions; needs for full implementation are estimated at US$1.3 billion. The announcement does not confirm full funding. | DRC / WHO / UN / Africa CDC and partners |
| 2–5 Sep 2026 | SitReps 111–113 bring the DRC status as of 4 September to 6,522 confirmed cases and 3,134 confirmed deaths. | SitRep 113 reports 1,516 recoveries, 817 patients in isolation or treatment centres and 61 affected zones; it newly reports Kayna in North Kivu. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 27 Aug–3 Sep 2026 | Ten African countries signed a memorandum of understanding on cross-border cooperation in health emergencies; WHO AFRO published it on 3 September. | The framework aims to improve coordination, information-sharing and preparedness and builds on the five-country BDBV risk consultation. This is an older newly published event, not a new case or risk assessment. | WHO AFRO |
| 24 Aug 2026 | WHO AFRO published its assessment 100 days after the outbreak declaration. | WHO called it the fastest-growing Ebola outbreak in DRC history and warned that transmission was outpacing control efforts; a substantial scale-up is needed to stop transmission. | WHO AFRO |
| 18–28 Aug 2026 | The second IHR Emergency Committee meeting was held and WHO published its full report. | The Committee recommended maintaining the PHEIC and called for urgent, intensified and sustained action. WHO does not recommend flight suspensions or denial of entry to travellers. | WHO IHR Emergency Committee |
| 25–27 Aug 2026 | A new phylodynamic analysis of 626 deposited genomes is posted and updated. | After quality control, the main analysis uses 525 genomes and centres the common ancestor in late February, with a wide uncertainty interval. Late sampling is sparse; this is neither a clinical case count nor an exact introduction date. | virological.org / INRB and partners |
| 24 Aug 2026 | Nature Medicine published two peer-reviewed accepted manuscripts: the case treated in Berlin and a five-person series given MBP134 after high- to intermediate-risk exposure. | The Berlin patient recovered, and the five exposed family contacts remained free of clinical or laboratory evidence of disease; neither a single case nor a five-person series establishes efficacy, approval or generalisable post-exposure protection. | Nature Medicine / Charité |
| August 2026 | The Lancet published a longitudinal cohort study of BDBV seroreactivity after rVSV-ZEBOV vaccination in two DRC populations. | Antibody-reactivity patterns differed substantially between sites. The study provides longitudinal seroreactivity data but does not establish clinical protection against BDBV; the between-site differences and baseline seroreactivity require further investigation. | The Lancet |
| 23–26 Aug 2026 | WHO AFRO report 15 summarises the DRC status as of 23 August: 5,584 confirmed cases and 2,680 confirmed deaths. | WHO reports 563 cases and 302 deaths more than report 14 and describes sustained transmission, high mortality and continuing geographic expansion. It was later superseded by report 16 with data as of 30 August. | WHO AFRO Weekly External Situation Report 15 |
| 14 Aug 2026 | Five countries begin a cross-border preparedness consultation in Bangui. | The joint roadmap and the mobile laboratory in Obo strengthen regional readiness; this is not a new confirmed case in the Central African Republic. | WHO AFRO |
| 12 Aug 2026 | INSP SitRep 90 provides primary confirmation that Bas-Uele is the sixth affected province. | At that time, Buta had one confirmed case and one confirmed death; SitRep 96 subsequently confirmed a second case in newly affected Viadana. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 10 Aug 2026 | According to AP, WHO's Regional Director for Africa says sequencing places the outbreak's start in February. | The official INRB analysis allows a common ancestor from February to April, and a CDC model estimates possible spillover in mid to late February. These are uncertain retrospective estimates, not a directly observed exact date. | WHO AFRO via AP; INRB; CDC |
| 9 Aug 2026 | WHO AFRO report 13 brings the DRC status to 4,381 confirmed cases and 2,011 confirmed deaths. | It reports 579 additional cases and 304 deaths over one week, a current case-fatality ratio of 45.9%, and intense and expanding transmission. | WHO AFRO / ECDC |
| 8–9 Aug 2026 | The DRC announces negative tests for suspected passengers from a river boat held near Maluku outside Kinshasa. | No case was confirmed in Kinshasa after laboratory testing. The result reduces concern about a new geography of transmission but does not end the outbreak in eastern DRC. | DRC MoH / INRB via AP |
| 7 Aug 2026 | WHO publishes new advisory-group recommendations on researching Ervebo against BDBV. | Ervebo should be prioritised for a Phase III trial. It remains approved only for EBOV, and the recommendation is not evidence of efficacy against BDBV. | WHO TAG-CVP |
| 7 Aug 2026 | SitRep 85 brings the detailed DRC status to 4,209 confirmed cases and 1,916 deaths among confirmed cases. | It reports 53 affected health zones, 828 recovered, 595 patients in isolation or treatment centres and follow-up of 83.4% of listed contacts. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 5–6 Aug 2026 | SitReps 83 and 84 record expansion to 53 health zones and further growth in reported cases. | Gombari in Haut-Uele and Bafwasende in Tshopo are newly affected. SitRep 83 is internally inconsistent at 1,850 versus 1,851 cumulative deaths; the discrepancy is preserved. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 4 Aug 2026 | SitRep 82 brings the DRC status to 3,973 confirmed cases and 1,801 deaths among confirmed cases. | It lists 17,781 contacts, of whom 75.3% were seen; 674 patients are in isolation and 776 people are recorded as recovered. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 4 Aug 2026 | WHO describes a mobile laboratory near Tchomia on the DRC–Uganda border. | Diagnostic time fell to about one hour and the network of laboratories able to confirm Ebola increased from 2 to 18. | WHO AFRO |
| 4 Aug 2026 | Moderna announces vaccination of the first participants in the Canadian mRNA-1469 candidate-vaccine trial. | A second concurrently running BDBV candidate-vaccine trial in humans begins. The Phase I trial evaluates safety, tolerability and immune response; this is not evidence of efficacy or vaccine approval. | Moderna / ClinicalTrials.gov |
| 3 Aug 2026 | SitRep 81 brings the DRC status to 3,874 confirmed cases and 1,751 deaths among confirmed cases. | That detailed national status listed five provinces, 51 health zones and follow-up of 78.4% of listed contacts. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 1–2 Aug 2026 | A suspected Ebola case was assessed in a woman with fever after returning from Uganda to the Czech Republic. | Transfer under controlled conditions and precautionary isolation followed the preparedness protocol; a Berlin laboratory ruled out Ebola. This was not a confirmed case and posed no risk to the public. | Czech MoH / Czech public health service; iROZHLAS |
| 1 Aug 2026 | SitRep 79 brought the then-current DRC status to 3,748 confirmed cases and 1,657 deaths among confirmed cases. | The report confirms five affected provinces but is internally inconsistent, giving 49 and 50 affected health zones. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 30 Jul 2026 | WHO AFRO publishes a new operational update on infection prevention and control in the DRC. | WHO teams supported more than 900 health facilities and trained over 1,000 health workers. This is documented strengthening of the response, not a new case count or treatment approval. | WHO AFRO |
| 28 Jul 2026 | Uganda announces national “officially Ebola-free” status. | The decision was based on fully documented importation, reconstructed transmission chains and completed contact follow-up. On 27 August, WHO AFRO formally announced the end of the outbreak after 42 days without a new confirmed case. Transmission and the PHEIC in the DRC continue. | Uganda MoH; WHO AFRO |
| 26 Jul 2026 | WHO AFRO describes the event as the largest recorded outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus. | The reported case count exceeded both previous known BDBV outbreaks. The comparison does not cover all Ebola outbreaks. | WHO AFRO Weekly External Situation Report 11 |
| 24 Jul 2026 | The first volunteer receives the ChAdOx1 BDBV vaccine candidate. | This is the first administration of this candidate vaccine to a human in a Phase I trial focused on safety and immune response. It is not evidence of efficacy, regulatory approval or public vaccination. | Oxford |
| 21–22 Jul 2026 | A UK resident is precautionarily evacuated to the United Kingdom after a potential health-care-related exposure in the DRC. | The person remained asymptomatic and was monitored in isolation. No Ebola case was confirmed in the UK, and UKHSA assessed the risk to the public as low. | UKHSA / WHO Europe |
| 19–20 Jul 2026 | Canada introduces temporary entry and quarantine measures. | From 20 July at 11:59 pm EDT, foreign nationals who were in the DRC during the previous 21 days may not enter Canada unless exempt under PHAC rules. Canadian citizens, permanent residents and other people authorized to enter may return; after a stay in the DRC, Uganda or South Sudan they undergo a health assessment and mandatory 21-day quarantine unless exempt from quarantine under PHAC rules. The measures differ from WHO and Africa CDC advice against blanket travel bans. | Canada/PHAC / IRCC; WHO / Africa CDC |
| 17 Jul 2026 | WHO AFRO warns of mounting operational pressure on the response. | More than 80% of new cases were detected outside known contact lists, around two thirds of deaths occurred in communities, and facilities in the hardest-hit areas were at or near capacity. | WHO AFRO |
| 17 Jul 2026 | WHO publishes DON613. | The update confirms continuing transmission in the DRC, the start of Uganda's countdown, completed contact follow-up in France and the stable condition of the patient in Frankfurt. This is not new transmission in Europe. | WHO |
| 16 Jul 2026 | Uganda discharges the last patient and begins the 42-day countdown. | At that point, the dashboard reported 18 recoveries and 0 current admissions. On 27 August, after the countdown ended without a new confirmed case, WHO AFRO formally announced the end of the outbreak. | Uganda MoH / WHO AFRO |
| 14 Jul 2026 | INRB and partners launch the EBO-PEP trial of obeldesivir as post-exposure prophylaxis. | The trial starts in Ituri and is planned to continue in the DRC and Uganda. Obeldesivir remains investigational; starting the trial is not evidence of efficacy or approval. | INRB / ANRS MIE–Inserm / ALIMA |
| 14 Jul 2026 | WHO publishes a target product profile for future vaccines against disease caused by Bundibugyo virus. | The document is intended to guide candidate development. It is not regulatory approval or evidence that a specific vaccine works. | WHO R&D Blueprint |
| 14 Jul 2026 | Singapore announces a US$2 million contribution to the DRC and Uganda response through Africa CDC and WHO. | The support is intended for laboratories, contact tracing, infection prevention and control, and clinical care; it is not a new epidemiological count. | Singapore CDA |
| 13 Jul 2026 | Oxford announces recruitment into the first Phase I trial in humans of the ChAdOx1 BDBV vaccine candidate. | The trial is planned to enrol 50 healthy adults. Starting a clinical trial is not evidence of efficacy or vaccine approval for public use. | Oxford / CEPI / HRA |
| 10–13 Jul 2026 | CDC reports a second US patient infected in the DRC; on 13 July the patient is medically evacuated under controlled conditions to Frankfurt. | The German health ministry says there is no risk to the public or other patients. The infection was not acquired in Germany. | CDC / BMG / ECDC |
| 24 Jun–13 Jul 2026 | European sources list the recovered imported case in France and, on 13 July, the controlled medical evacuation to Frankfurt of a second US patient infected in the DRC. | This is not community transmission in France or Germany. ECDC continues to assess the likelihood of infection for people living in the EU/EEA as very low. | ECDC / WHO / BMG / CDC |
| 11–12 Jul 2026 | The DRC publishes SitRep 58 and newly lists Ariwara among affected health zones. | As of 11 July, it reports 1,926 confirmed cases, 702 deaths among confirmed cases, 318 recovered and 42 affected health zones in five provinces. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 9 Jul 2026 | INRB and partners publish a new genomic epidemiology analysis. | The initial dataset includes 139 DRC genomes sampled from 2 May to 23 June; after quality control, individual phylogenetic analyses use smaller subsets. Estimates of the common ancestor, evolutionary rate and doubling time have uncertainty intervals and do not replace epidemiological case counts. | virological.org / INRB |
| 6–9 Jul 2026 | The WHO daily update moves the main DRC status to 7 July and Uganda to 8 July. | WHO daily table 20260709 reports 1,780 confirmed cases and 602 confirmed deaths across the DRC, Uganda and France combined. The DRC has 1,759 confirmed cases and 600 confirmed deaths as of 7 July; Uganda remains at 20 confirmed cases and 2 deaths as of 8 July; the French imported case is listed as recovered as of 6 July. | WHO |
| 4–7 Jul 2026 | Local sources report 17 newly laboratory-confirmed cases in Nia-Nia after delayed sample transport to Bunia. | The update shows the practical impact of delayed diagnostics and response constraints in Ituri. After WHO 20260709, we do not present it as a figure outside the headline total; the public table does not identify what part of the increase belongs specifically to Nia-Nia. | Radio Okapi / Actualité.cd / Bunia Actualité / WHO |
| 29 Jun–7 Sep 2026 | Pathoplexus contains database records for Bundibugyo virus; the count is unchanged from the previous published version. | At the 7 September check, LAPIS aggregation showed 753 versioned database entries for outbreak Bdbv-2026: 731 from the DRC, 20 from Uganda and 2 from Germany. Their count is not a clinical case count, the number of genomes in one analysis, or evidence of a dangerous mutation. | Pathoplexus |
| 4–5 Jul 2026 | DRC INSP/COUSP SitRep 51 confirms a further increase in reported confirmed cases and deaths in the DRC. | SitRep 51 reports, as of 4 July, 1,561 confirmed cases, 506 deaths among confirmed cases, 254 recovered, 628 people hospitalised in isolation and 354 suspected cases in the DRC. For 4 July, it reports 33 newly confirmed cases, 30 in Ituri and 3 in North Kivu. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 4 Jul 2026 | Uganda's Ministry of Health explains the 42-day countdown before Uganda can declare the outbreak over. | Uganda has not reported a new confirmed case since 21 June, but cross-border risk from the DRC continues. The countdown can restart if a new case linked to ongoing transmission is detected. | Uganda MoH |
| 3 Jul 2026 | WHO publishes Disease Outbreak News DON612. | DON612 is a newly published interpretive source, but numerically it uses an older status than WHO daily update 20260717: the DRC as of 1 July, Uganda as of 2 July and the French notification of 24 June. The key interpretive point is WHO's repeated caution about retrospective sample processing and data harmonisation. | WHO DON612 |
| 2 Jul 2026 | WHO announces the start of patient enrolment in the PARTNERS trial in the DRC. | The trial evaluates MBP134 and remdesivir, alone and in combination, in confirmed cases of disease caused by Bundibugyo virus. This is clinical evaluation of candidate therapeutics, not approved routine treatment. | WHO |
| 2 Jul 2026 | WHO adds the first molecular diagnostic test for BDBV to its Emergency Use Listing. | The emergency listing is intended to speed reliable diagnosis and surveillance. It is a diagnostic test, not a vaccine or treatment; according to WHO, laboratory capacity in the DRC has expanded to 10 laboratories. | WHO |
| 29 Jun–1 Jul 2026 | ECDC updates the outbreak page and publishes a report from its fact-finding mission on airport exit screening in Kinshasa and Entebbe. | In its 1 July version, ECDC adopted DRC figures as of 29 June and Ugandan figures as of 30 June; this was later superseded by the ECDC update of 6 July. The mission report describes that exit screening can reduce the risk of symptomatic travellers departing, but cannot fully prevent case exportation. | ECDC |
| 28 Jun–1 Jul 2026 | WHO AFRO Weekly External Situation Report 07 publishes an older data status as of 28 June. | The report is newly published but numerically older than WHO daily update 20260717 and SitRep 58. It is useful mainly for the weekly summary: Uganda reported no new confirmed cases over the previous week, while confirmed cases and deaths increased in the DRC and Mandima appeared among affected health zones. | WHO AFRO |
| 25–30 Jun 2026 | The DRC publishes SitRep 42, SitRep 44, SitRep 46 and SitRep 47; SitRep 47 becomes the main public DRC status. | INSP SitRep 42 reports, as of 25 June, 1,203 confirmed cases and 321 deaths among confirmed cases in the DRC. SitRep 44 reports, as of 27 June, 1,274 confirmed cases and 360 deaths; Mandima in Ituri is newly affected. SitRep 46 reports, as of 29 June, 1,333 confirmed cases and 399 deaths. SitRep 47 reports, as of 30 June, 1,406 confirmed cases and 438 deaths, adds Lolwa as an affected health zone in Ituri, and describes cases in Haut-Uélé and Tshopo as reported under Nia-Nia in Ituri. SitRep 43 and 45 were not found during the check, so the missing days are not interpolated. | DRC INSP / COUSP |
| 29 Jun 2026 | DRC INSP announces the launch of the PANTHER study and training of research teams in Bunia. | This is a clinical evaluation of antiviral treatment for BDBV in collaboration with Oxford, WHO and INRB; it is not an approved treatment. | DRC INSP |
| 27–29 Jun 2026 | WHO AFRO and Africa CDC launch a Continental Incident Management Support Team (IMST) in Kampala. | This is an operational coordination step for the DRC, Uganda and 10 priority countries in the region; the team is to be fully operational from 29 June. It is not a new case count. | WHO AFRO / Africa CDC |
| 26 Jun 2026 | WHO issues a statement on immunomodulators and host-directed therapies for BVD. | The WHO TAG-TP notes that patient data on BDBV pathogenesis are still lacking; experience from EBOV is therefore not sufficient on its own for selecting such candidates for BVD clinical trials. | WHO TAG-TP |
| 25 Jun 2026 | The Lancet Infectious Diseases publishes a modelling study on outbreak size and cross-border spillover risk. | This scientific publication uses an older data status, including calibration to 598 confirmed cases as of 8 June. It is useful for uncertainty and preparedness context, not for 24 July headline counts. | The Lancet Infectious Diseases |
| 24 Jun 2026 | The DRC and Uganda announce a 90-day cross-border joint response plan. | SitRep 41 lists it as an operational shift in coordination; priorities include laboratory capacity and clinical-care capacity. | Uganda MoH / DRC INSP |
| 17–20 Jun 2026 | WHO DON608 and DRC INSP SitRep 34–36 publish rapidly changing figures for specific days. | WHO DON608 works with DRC data as of 17 June and Uganda as of 18 June. DRC INSP SitRep 36, published on 20 June with data as of 19 June, reported 956 confirmed cases and 247 deaths among confirmed cases; after the data as of 21 June it is already an older interim status. | WHO DON608 / DRC INSP |
| 17–18 Jun 2026 | ECDC publishes a modelling overview and a European checklist for preparedness for an imported case. | Models suggest the true size of the outbreak may be higher than the reported counts, but the estimates are highly uncertain. The European documents continue to assess the risk to the general EU/EEA population as very low and serve mainly for preparedness planning. | ECDC |
| 17 Jun 2026 | WHO issues a summary of new clinical recommendations for filovirus diseases. | WHO emphasises early supportive care and explicitly reiterates that there are no licensed vaccines or specific treatment for diseases caused by Bundibugyo and Sudan viruses. | WHO clinical recommendations for filovirus diseases |
| 11 Jun 2026 | Nature Medicine publishes a short scientific communication on the Ugandan index case. | This is a new publication of an older event: the patient was admitted in Kampala on 11 May, died on 14 May, and sequencing confirmed Bundibugyo virus with high genome coverage. | Nature Medicine |
| 10 Jun 2026 | Bulovka University Hospital discharges the precautionarily monitored US physician after the incubation period elapses. | He did not develop the disease; this was not a confirmed case of Ebola in the Czech Republic. | Bulovka University Hospital / ČTK |
| 6 Jun 2026 | Charité discharges the confirmed-infected US patient and his family contacts after isolation/quarantine is lifted. | The patient had a confirmed infection and symptoms, while his family remained symptom-free and without evidence of the virus. Do not conflate this situation with the Czech precautionary isolations. | Charité |
| 5 Jun 2026 | Africa CDC and WHO launch a continental response plan for June–November 2026. | The response moves to a broader regional mode, emphasising epidemiological surveillance, laboratories, clinical care, community work and cross-border coordination. | Africa CDC / WHO |
| 28 May 2026 | WHO publishes recommendations on candidate treatments and vaccines. | WHO confirms that no specifically approved vaccine or targeted treatment for Bundibugyo yet exists; candidate products belong in clinical trials. | WHO R&D Blueprint |
| 22 May 2026 | A Czech soldier returning from a UN mission in the DRC is precautionarily isolated in Těchonín. | Another Czech event without symptoms and without confirmed infection; it was only published on 2 June. | Czech Armed Forces / iROZHLAS / ČTK |
| 20–21 May 2026 | A US physician with confirmed infection is treated in Berlin; another US physician is precautionarily isolated at Bulovka after a risk contact. | For the Czech context, the confirmed case in Germany must be distinguished from the precautionary isolation in the Czech Republic. | Charité / ČTK / Bulovka University Hospital |
| 18 May 2026 | The first three genomes from the current outbreak are published. | Sequencing supports the interpretation of a new zoonotic introduction, but conclusions remain cautious given the limited number of samples. | virological.org / Pathoplexus |
| 17 May 2026 | WHO declares a PHEIC. | This is an international health emergency requiring coordination; WHO also stated that the event does not meet the criteria for a “pandemic emergency” under the International Health Regulations. | WHO |
| 15 May 2026 | Uganda confirms an imported case linked to travel from the DRC. | The outbreak takes on a cross-border dimension, but later Ugandan cases remain epidemiologically linked to the DRC. | Uganda MoH / WHO |
| 14–15 May 2026 | Samples negative on a test targeting Ebola virus (EBOV) are confirmed as Bundibugyo virus; the DRC declares its 17th Ebola epidemic. | A key distinction: the causative agent is BDBV, so vaccines and treatments intended for EBOV cannot be adopted automatically. | DRC MoH / INRB / WHO |
| 5 May 2026 | WHO receives a report of an unusual illness with deaths among health workers. | Formal international reporting and field investigation begin. | WHO |
| 24 Apr 2026 | First currently known suspected case in Ituri. | The outbreak was only recognised retrospectively; the early phase therefore probably escaped routine epidemiological surveillance. | WHO DON |
Ebola does not spread through the air like a common respiratory infection, and according to WHO a person is not infectious before the onset of symptoms.
Laboratory testing ruled out Ebola in the woman returning from Uganda on 2 August. Precautionary isolation and transfer under controlled conditions are not a confirmed case or community transmission.
WHO notes that newly reported confirmed cases and deaths may be linked to the retrospective processing of previously unevaluated samples and to data harmonisation.
For more detail, see Myths & misinformation.
This website applies the FAIR principles: its content and supporting data are findable, accessible, described with standardised machine-readable metadata for interoperability, and prepared for reuse.
For each version, we provide the authors, verification date, primary sources and terms of use. Data used in charts can be downloaded together with a data dictionary and information about their provenance and limitations.
Machine-readable layer: website metadata in JSON-LD. Unless stated otherwise, the original text, charts created for this website, data curation and machine-readable metadata are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0). This licence does not apply to logos, trademarks, or cited or linked third-party materials; those remain subject to the terms of their respective rights holders.